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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-3975 
_____________ 
                         
GAZI SARWAR HUSSAN, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent                          
_____________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No. A070-910-171) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry Dogin 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 21, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Gazi Sarwar Hussan petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
order affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge denying his application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against 
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Torture, and cancellation of removal.  For the following reasons, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
I. 
 Hussan, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, entered the United States on June 3, 
1992, without a valid entry document.  Hussan is a member of the Jatiya Party, and 
claims that he will be persecuted on account of his political opinion if he returns to 
Bangladesh, which is controlled by the Bangladesh National Party. 
 To support his claim, Hussan testified that he was peacefully leading a political 
demonstration on Bangladesh Independence Day, March 26, 1991, to demand the release 
of Jatiya Party member and former President Hussain Muhammad Ershad when he and 
other members of his party were attacked by BNP members who threw stones and 
brandished sticks.  Although he declares that they did nothing wrong, Hussan and some 
of his fellow demonstrators were arrested and charged with inciting a riot in connection 
with the March 26 events.  Hussan attended some of the pre-trial hearings in his criminal 
case, but was again beaten by BNP members as he left one of the hearings, this time 
severely, causing injuries to his leg that required him to seek treatment in a hospital.  
Hussan testified that he continued to receive threats, and so he stopped attending his 
hearings, went into hiding, and ultimately fled. 
 The Bangladeshi trial court convicted Hussan’s four co-defendants of crimes 
related to the violence that occurred during the March 26 demonstration, but their 
convictions were overturned on appeal.  The trial court also convicted Hussan, in 
absentia, and sentenced him to three years in prison.  Because Hussan had already fled 
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Bangladesh, however, he was not able to file an appeal.  His lawyer in Bangladesh 
confirmed that the time to appeal his conviction has expired. 
 In addition to his own testimony, Hussan called a former Jatiya Party member, 
who testified that the police in Bangladesh held an outstanding warrant for Hussan’s 
arrest.  Hussan also provided documents from the Bangladeshi court confirming his 
conviction as well as letters from the Jatiya Party confirming his position in the party and 
corroborating the facts of Hussan’s co-defendants’ convictions and subsequent appeals. 
 The IJ denied Hussan relief, finding that Hussan had not proven persecution on 
account of political opinion.  Instead, the IJ reasoned, the record indicated that 
Bangladesh had lawfully prosecuted Hussan for participating in what ultimately became a 
riot.  The IJ noted that, apart from his own testimony, Hussan had not produced 
additional evidence supporting his claim that he was wrongfully prosecuted, or that he 
had sustained a leg injury requiring hospital treatment.  The IJ also found that Hussan had 
failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause his United States citizen children 
exceptional or extremely unusual hardship, or that he would be tortured if returned to 
Bangladesh.  Thus, the IJ determined that Hussan had not met his burden and denied his 
application for relief.  The BIA affirmed. 
II. 
 Hussan now petitions this Court for review.  Chiefly, Hussan asserts that the IJ and 
the BIA improperly required corroborating evidence, and denied his petition on this 
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ground without first affording him notice and the opportunity to provide such evidence.1  
Because we find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and the BIA’s determination 
that Hussan failed to meet his burden of proof on his asylum and withholding of removal 
claims, and that his cancellation of removal and CAT claims also fail, we will deny 
Hussan’s petition for review.2
A. 
 
 As the petitioner, Hussan bears the burden of proof to establish a well-founded 
fear of persecution as part of his asylum and withholding of removal claims.  Shardar v. 
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).  Whether a petitioner has adequately 
demonstrated such a fear of persecution is a finding of fact, which we review under the 
substantial evidence standard; we will reverse only where “any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).   
 Hussan argues that the BIA erred by refusing to allow him to supplement the 
record and remand his case to the IJ to follow the procedural requirements we set forth in 
Abdulai v. Ashcroft.  239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (establishing procedural 
requirements for dismissing petition for asylum based on failure to produce corroborating 
                                              
1 Hussan raises several additional challenges, including allegations that the IJ improperly 
allowed into evidence documents not previously served on him, applied erroneous 
standards of law, made erroneous determinations of fact, and that the hearing was 
conducted in a prejudicial manner.  The BIA, however, found that the adequacy or 
inadequacy of proof in the record would ultimately control the disposition of Hussan’s 
appeal.  The BIA also noted that the record did not reflect any prejudice otherwise 
preventing Hussan from presenting his case.  We agree, and as such we will focus our 
discussion on the burden of proof and corroboration issues. 
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction over Hussan’s appeal from the IJ’s determination under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  This Court’s jurisdiction arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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evidence).  But the IJ did not deny Hussan relief based merely on the absence of 
corroborating evidence.  Instead, the IJ determined that the evidence Hussan presented 
did not establish his eligibility for relief. 
 We previously denied a petition for review on facts almost identical to those 
before us.  See Shardar, 382 F.3d at 320.  In Shardar v. Ashcroft, the petitioner, also a 
member of Bangladesh’s Jatiya Party, claimed fear of persecution based on his political 
opinion.  Id.  To support his claim, the petitioner offered his own testimony, and also 
presented documentary evidence including a police report, court records, an outstanding 
arrest warrant, and letters from his lawyer, the Jatiya Party, and a medical clinic that 
treated the petitioner for injuries.  Id. at 321 (highlighting police report, which stated that 
petitioner led others to engage in violent protest).  The IJ determined that the petitioner 
had in no way met his burden of proof because the objective evidence established that the 
government sought to prosecute the petitioner for his violent behavior, not to persecute 
him for expressing a political opinion.  Id.  The BIA affirmed.  Id. at 322.  We denied the 
petition for review, finding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s order.  Id. at 
323 (“[T]he IJ did not merely deny Shardar’s claim because of the absence of 
corroborating evidence.  Rather, the documentary evidence that was presented conflicted 
with Shardar’s contention that the demonstration was peaceful.”).  We also 
acknowledged the difference between persecution and prosecution: “As a general 
matter, . . . fear of prosecution for violations of ‘fairly administered laws’ does not itself 
qualify one as a ‘refugee’ or make one eligible for withholding of deportation.”  Id.  
(citation omitted). 
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 In light of the similarities between this case and Shardar, we cannot conclude that 
this record compels us to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the IJ and the BIA.  As in 
Shardar, the record in this case indicates that Bangladesh lawfully prosecuted Hussan for 
his role in what began as a political demonstration but ended as a riot.  Hussan’s 
proposed supplemental evidence—including medical records, letters from his co-
defendants, the appellate court judgment reversing his co-defendants’ convictions, and a 
party chairman’s affidavit—does not disprove the BIA’s conclusion.  Instead, as the BIA 
noted, this evidence suggests that had Hussan remained in Bangladesh, he too could have 
used the court system to challenge the charges against him. 
 Furthermore, prosecution under generally applicable laws only constitutes grounds 
for asylum where such prosecution is motivated by a statutorily protected ground, and the 
punishment under the law is sufficiently serious to constitute persecution.  See id. 
(citations omitted).  Hussan has made no such showing here.  While he may 
understandably fear imprisonment in Bangladesh for his conviction arising from the 1991 
protest—indeed, it appears that the time for him to appeal the conviction has run—that 
fear alone does not demonstrate persecution. 
B. 
 The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of Hussan’s application for cancellation of 
removal because Hussan had not demonstrated that his removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for his United States citizen children.  We 
lack jurisdiction to review that discretionary determination.  See Patel v. Attorney Gen. of 
the U.S., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary 
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decisions made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, including ‘exceptional and extremely 
unusual’ hardship determinations.”) (citations omitted). 
C. 
 Lastly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief.  Apart from 
the evidence offered to support his petition for asylum and withholding of removal, 
which fails for the reasons set forth above, Hussan has not provided any additional 
evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if 
removed to Bangladesh. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Hussan’s petition for review. 
